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EMORY JOHNSON AND THE RISE OF ECONOMIC EXPERTISE IN THE PROGRESSIVE
STATE, 1898–1913

Emory Johnson served in a series of executive-branch appointments pertaining to the Panama Canal. Like many
other executive experts, he used his professional skills and reputation as political tools, promoting the canal and
bringing its toll-making under his control. His activities diverged from what scholars have described as other
experts’ practice of gaining influence by insulating themselves from the preceding era’s partisan politics, however.
An avowed Republican, he worked in collaboration with appointed officials and lobbied members of the public and
Congress alike. Although he presented economic data as objective fact, his persuasive efforts drew heavily on an
often-forgotten strand of the party’s ideological tradition. It paradoxically promoted transportation projects
simultaneously in associative terms, as using the market to secure the Union, and as benefiting the divergent
interests of competing individual localities. Johnson’s work reveals a professional in the federal government as a
more multidimensional historical figure than that which appears in accounts describing experts as symbols of an
undemocratic administrative state, illustrating a complex set of ties between the preceding period’s political beliefs
and practices and the rise of an administrative state.

Emory Johnson began his service to the federal government when he joined the team of scholars
recruited by the United States Industrial Commission in1898. President William McKinley had
asked the Commission to examine and report on what one observer termed “this new and strange
industrialism” and its impact on American society.1 The body, comprised of nine congressmen
and nine private citizens, quickly found itself floundering. None of its members possessed a
detailed knowledge of the individual industries and other topics that they had been asked to
study. An economist at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School of Business
specializing in transportation matters, Johnson readily provided the commissioners with a sense
of the major problems confronting the nation’s rail and water carriers. The young professor
immediately found his services to be in considerable demand. He had not even completed his
work for the Industrial Commission when he received an appointment to the Isthmian Canal
Commission of 1899–1902. Retaining his position at the Wharton School throughout his federal
service, he in 1910 returned to the subject of the then nearly completed project to serve as special
commissioner for Panama Canal Traffic and Tolls. Like many other professionals working in the
Progressive State, Johnson often condemned Democratic politics and used his expert skills,
knowledge, and reputation to find increasing levels of autonomy and influence there.2 Yet his
career also reveals a very different aspect of professional expertise’s emergence in the federal
government in this period. He gained his appointments and consolidated his authority as a loyal
Republican, and proved himself to be well-acquainted with the practices of partisan, democratic
politics in several respects. Focusing his critique of popular government on Congress, he worked
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closely with senior appointees in the McKinley and Taft administrations, providing reports and
testimony to lawmakers and lobbying them directly to win their approval for the canal and bring
a completed project under expert, executive authority. He laid out a case for the canal rooted in
his party’s ideological tradition, and even used a series of personal appearances around the
nation to attempt to persuade representatives of local interests to support the canal and what he
and his allies took to be its proper administration. In each case expertise provided Johnson with
political capital that allowed him to bring familiar political beliefs and dynamics to bear on
behalf of an administrative state that would supposedly supplant them.
Scholars have often concluded that professional experts’ work in the Progressive State
represented a fundamental departure from the preceding century’s political dynamics, creating a
largely undemocratic governmental apparatus that controlled specific aspects of federal policy
making.3 Daniel Carpenter has showed how professionals employed in bureaucratically
organized agencies that emerged in the executive branch in this period won the autonomy and
influence necessary to build this apparatus by using their skills, knowledge, and reputation to
insulate themselves from elected officials, even as they aligned themselves with new interest
groups.4 Johnson created a very different variety of expertise in the federal government in part
because he worked in a fundamentally different institutional context. Unlike the professional
social scientists that Carpenter and others have described, Johnson served in a series of
temporary appointments. In doing so he participated in a phenomenon that a recent work has
called “statebuilding from the margins,” in which political actors from outside the federal
government took on new roles within it and pressed their agendas on federal officials, “offering
their own privately developed capacity to bolster the state’s capability to achieve their desired
policy outcomes.”5 Philadelphia Republicans helped Johnson to secure two of his appointments,
but his arguments and activities identified him as more than a mere placeman.6 They made him a
professional engaged with one of the major intellectual traditions influencing his discipline.
Although intellectual historians and students of American political thought have described the
Republican Party and its political ideology’s influence on the first generations of American
professional social scientists that emerged in this period, work examining the roles that many of
these experts played in the Progressive State has often overlooked these connections.7
Dorothy Ross, Mary O. Furner, and Eldon Eisenach have shown that many social scientists of
Johnson’s generation grew up in strongly Whig and Republican households.8 There they
inherited a vision of an assertive federal government devoted to securing the Union.9 Johnson
certainly fit this description. He went on to earn his academic credentials with studies of
nineteenth-century Whigs and Republicans’ efforts to build internal improvements, and he made
one of their central propositions—that canals helped to secure the Union and, together with other
transportation improvements, facilitated the rise of a dynamic, integrated economy—the
informing principle of his academic work and political activities.10 In doing so, he revisited a
phenomenon that scholars of Whigs and Republicans’ political beliefs have largely neglected,
however. Champions of individual localities often sought to turn the state’s construction of a
national transportation infrastructure to their own advantage, describing an interconnected Union
with their own locality as its hub in order to secure local support.11 Johnson made this
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paradoxical strand of the Republican Party’s state-building creed the intellectual keystone of his
work on behalf of an expert-administered Panama Canal.
Richard John and Brian Balogh have already urged scholars to consider how preceding political
arrangements laid the foundation for this period’s growth of federal administrative capacity. John
has argued that a nineteenth-century state regulatory regime marked by its autonomy from
popular politics informed later, similar developments that gave professional experts roles in
federal policymaking.12 Although Johnson’s work supports the basic contention that earlier
political arrangements contributed to the development of an administrative state, it also reveals a
very different set of contributions best explained by reference to Balogh’s work. He has brought
welcome attention to the role of nineteenth-century political beliefs in the larger American statebuilding project. He argued that an antebellum “developmental vision” recognizing and
embracing the combined self-interest of individuals who stood to benefit from state action
provided “an enduring ideological foundation for national governance.”13 Johnson became
familiar with this argument for the state in his review of the American System of internal
improvements that it so often supported, and his case for the Panama Canal lent the authority of
economic expertise to its contention that government promotion of economic development could
achieve public purposes. He described the waterway’s operations as Balogh has characterized
other institutional products of the developmental vision, as a variety of associative political
activity. In his view, the state’s construction and administration of new transportation
infrastructure allowed the workings of the marketplace to secure the Union and produce social
progress. Although the professor never directly identified his approach as an alternative to more
conspicuous types of state activity, he pointedly acknowledged what he perceived to be
Americans’ suspicion of a too-strong state. Johnson’s work also reveals another aspect of the
developmental vision that Balogh has noted, but not discussed in detail. At the same time that it
brought Americans together to support increased levels of state activity, this ideological
construct stoked the geographical rivalries that drove them apart. Localities’ fierce competition
to turn state policy initiatives to the benefit of their own interests often found expression through
electoral politics, but antebellum federal officials also manipulated their ambitions in order to
securepoliticalsupportfortransportationinitiatives.14When Johnson presented the same Panama
Canal that secured the Union as benefiting local interests over those of their competitors, he
revisited this technique. In the end, the professor’s reports to Congress, lobbying activities, and
remarks before local audiences did not themselves carry the day for administrative toll-making,
and certainly not for the construction of the Panama Canal. He served as a member of a team of
federal officials that did so together. His part in the successful initiative shows, however, how
economic expertise proved just as helpful in the arena of democratic politics as it had in other
professionals’ search for autonomy and influence in the federal bureaucracy. This in turn made
Johnson a more conflicted, ambiguous political actor than scholars considering experts’ roles in
the Progressive State have described, and at least one portion of the state itself significantly more
complex, in its workings and its origins, than they have realized.
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REPUBLICAN SCHOLAR, 1864–1897
Born in 1864 in Waupun, Wisconsin, Emory Johnson grew up in a decidedly Republican
household. When his father Eli Johnson died young in 1879, his neighbors remembered him as
“a thorough-going Republican from the time the party was organized” who assumed
responsibility for raising “men and means during the rebellion.”15 As a student at the University
of Wisconsin Johnson prepared a senior thesis for Frederick Jackson Turner on “The Rise and
Fall of the Whig System of Improvements.”16 The essay examined federal policy toward the
improvement of harbors, the construction of canals, and the canalization of rivers to 1840.17
Johnson returned to the subject of internal improvements in graduate study at the Johns Hopkins
University, taking a master’s degree. In Herbert Baxter Adams’s seminar he extended his history
of the United States’ river and harbor legislation to encompass the rise of the Republican
program to 1890.18 After further study overseas, Johnson enrolled at the Wharton School in
1892, receiving his PhD in the fall of 1893.19 He became assistant professor of transportation
there in 1896.
Johnson’s early work explicitly took up the question of the role of expertise in the American
state. Advocating the construction of a coordinated national transportation system, he maintained
that success relied upon what he termed “executive functions.” He sought to empower the federal
government’s executive branch as experts’ natural home. Such professionals could provide the
national perspective that American transportation policymaking needed so badly. Examining the
federal government’s improvement of rivers and harbors, Johnson argued for “an historical study
of the subject to show what Congress has done, to analyze critically what Congress is now doing
and to compare our methods … with the methods other nations employ.”20 He proposed that the
Secretary of War, whom he optimistically perceived as “being quite free from political pressure
and relying on the counsel of the engineers,” make “a really economic and scientific
application”: in short, an expert study of which projects deserved government support and which
did not. Reform, he concluded, “will follow the extension of executive functions.”21
Johnson’s doctoral thesis, “Inland Waterways: Their Relation to Transportation,” reiterated his
call for the state to coordinate the activities of water carriers and railroads as a national system.
Noting that “The democratic spirit of Americans is chary of granting much power to the
executive,” he observed that “the administrative part of our government is still undeveloped.”22
Nevertheless, he advocated state control of waterways. Rivers and canals helped to keep railroad
rates low by providing a competing service for the transportation of bulk commodities, he
explained. If the waterways became private businesses, powerful railroads would surely purchase
them, negating their competitive function.23 Johnson explicitly named a prospective isthmian
canal as a crucial component of a national transportation system. It would reduce
transcontinental railroad rates and integrate the United States’ far-flung sections.24 Ultimately,
Johnson saw the waterway in evangelical, almost millennial, terms. Returning to his brief for
executive action, he rued the fact that “The United States seems to stand before this project
hesitating to enter upon it, much as the children of Israel stood at the entrance to the Promised
Land and would not enter in. We, too, need some Joshua for a leader.”25
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Johnson’s appeal for a national transportation system drew on a larger argument, originally
developed in the antebellum period, for the state using internal improvements to promote
national economic, social, and political integration. DeWitt Clinton imagined the Erie Canal as
producing a “whole republic … bound together by the golden ties of commerce and the
adamantine ties of interest.”26 Clinton’s undertaking of course predated the Whig Party but, as
Daniel Walker Howe has pointed out, Whigs made internal improvements a pillar of their
American System and emphasized their ability to unify a far-flung republic.27 In 1846 the
Philadelphian Jacob Dewees extended the argument to railroads, noting how they would unify
the American people,“ binding them together by a unity of interests.”28
This tradition included a powerful, parochial undertow, however. When the federal government
declined to build internal improvements in 1817, individual states took up the task.29 Even as
Clinton praised the Erie Canal for integrating the nation, he could not help but note that it had
also succeeded in making New York City “the great depot and warehouse of the western world.”
Another New Yorker hoped that the waterway would make his city “the polar star of every
valuable improvement throughout the Union.”30 Pennsylvania and Maryland took up state
projects of their own in the years following the initiation of the Erie Canal, in hopes of gaining a
larger portion of the West’s growing commerce. In 1836 Philadelphians emphasized that the
nearby Schuylkill Valley “belongs exclusively to Philadelphia. Within its precincts no rival can
intrude. … Whatever reaches the Schuylkill must come to Philadelphia and to Philadelphia
only.”31 In 1852 friends of the Quaker City’s western railroads deftly explained that their city
would not “hesitate to provide the bands of an iron union whereby she may reserve” other cities
“as profitable customers and faithful allies.”32 Behind the nationalist rhetoric this phenomenon,
which one observer dubbed the “ugly genius of rivalry,” produced an American transportation
infrastructure made up of a number of individual, largely uncoordinated, concerns.33 Each of the
great American cities imagined itself as the “polar star” of the emerging economic order, as
Johnson acknowledged in his thesis.34 In at least two instances during the early antebellum
period, federal officials exploited such competing sets of national ambitions in their attempt to
win support for what they imagined as internal improvements that would integrate the nation’s
divergent sections.35 Railroad promoters did the same thing during the decades surrounding the
Civil War, a practice that Johnson later recognized in a 1908 publication.36 In the Gilded Age,
the Republican Party again cited internal improvements as aids to national integration.37
Johnson’s academic mentor Simon Patten, a stalwart Republican himself, agreed.38 He praised
the party for using improvements to secure “a real nationalism … not provincialism” in
America.39 Further state development of transportation networks especially stood to benefit the
South, where industrial development needed “particular encouragement. The key to national
prosperity lies in Southern prosperity.”40 Patten ignored the geographical rivalries at the heart of
his Republican view of internal improvements, but circumstances would place Emory Johnson in
a position to revisit them.
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THE UNITED STATES INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 1898–99
In 1898 Johnson and other professional economists took the national stage with the formation of
the United States Industrial Commission. Pennsylvania Congressman Thomas Wharton Phillips
led the charge for an investigative panel similar to the British Royal Commissions on Labour,
and in 1898 President McKinley signed legislation creating the new body. Congress chose five
men from the Senate and five from the House, a total of six Republicans and four Democrats, to
serve on the Commission, while McKinley chose nine members of the public, including a former
Republican governor and Phillips, recently retired from Congress.41 Turning to their charge, the
commissioners had no idea how to proceed. The legislation creating the Industrial Commission
had called for the preparation of reports discussing specific industrial sectors and industries.
Continuing the federal government’s traditional means of gathering information, the
Commission initially relied upon the process of hearing oral testimony from interested parties.
This practice uncovered several problems, however. In the case of trusts, the Commission’s
Preliminary Report noted
the witnesses summoned were either persons connected with the combinations—hence those inclined to see their
favorable side—or their rivals, who were naturally led to see and speak of their evil aspects. An inevitable result has
been that the evidence, even on questions of fact, as often been contradictory, and in some instances it has been
impossible from the testimony so taken to reach any positive conclusion.42

E. Dana Durand, a commissioner who served as the body’s Director of Research, noted that
when a witness came before the body, “the difficulty is only begun. … A high degree of expert
knowledge regarding the matters on which the witness is expected to testify becomes
essential.”43 In this context the Industrial Commission began to call on professional social
scientists to help prepare the commissioners for public testimony, and to provide additional
testimony as well. Phillips invited Johnson to appear before the Commission, and he did so on
March 3, 1899.44 The commissioners’ questions largely emphasized railroad issues, and Johnson
informed the hearing that he regarded therailroadsasapublicservice.45 Durand further encouraged
the Industrial Commission to “map out its field thoroughly, and select experts to work it for facts
systematically and comprehensively.”46 The body soon invited “university men and trained
investigators” to investigate specific topics.47 A few weeks after his testimony Johnson received
and accepted a request to prepare the Industrial Commission’s report on transportation.48

THE ISTHMIAN CANAL COMMISSION, 1899–1901
Emory Johnson left his position as expert to the United States Industrial Commission to begin
work as a member of the Isthmian Canal Commission in late 1899.49 Again, he owed his
appointment to Pennsylvania Republicans. Although scholars exploring professional social
scientists’ integration into the Progressive State have emphasized their original institutional
homes in national professional associations and nationally oriented universities, the University of
Pennsylvania maneuvered to secure its interests in a local context as well.50 Its leaders actively
cultivated ties with local and state officials in this period, due in part to their institution’s
persistent need for additional financial support.51 In 1894 they hired Charles Harrison, a wealthy
sugar manufacturer who had recently sold his Philadelphia operations to the New York-based
6

American Sugar Refining Company, as provost. In addition to providing a series of generous
donations, Harrison cemented the university’s ties to the Republican Party. He served as
treasurer of the party’s committee for Pennsylvania and went on to raise campaign funds of some
$400,000 for McKinley’s reelection in 1900.52 Harrison encouraged President McKinley to
appoint Johnson to the body.53
The young professor immediately began to prepare a report detailing the canal’s economic
impact on the United States and the world, but his work meant little to the body’s principal
activities. The McKinley administration had already decided to move toward a canal’s
construction and turned the Commission toward the delicate matter of securing a suitable path
across the isthmus. It surveyed the Panamanian and Nicaraguan routes, but in fact focused its
efforts on acquiring rights to the French-owned New Panama Canal Company’s abandoned
excavation. Johnson did not join the commissioners who in August of 1899 traveled to Paris for
the purpose of examining the New Panama Canal Company’s charts and documents and,
presumably, attempting to negotiate a price for their Panama concession.54 He remained in the
United States, patiently gathering data for his portion of the Commission’s report.55
Between April 1900 and November 1901 the Commission failed to bring the French below a
price of $109,141,500 for the existing works. In their report the commissioners mentioned the
exorbitant French demands, valued the property at $40,000,000, and recommended that any
American project follow the Nicaraguan route explored by a preceding commission.56 The result,
as Johnson recalled, “was what was expected by the Commission.”57 In light of the Americans’
apparent willingness to move forward in Nicaragua the French company capitulated and
promptly voted to sell the property to the Americans for $40,000,000. President Theodore
Roosevelt asked the Commission to reconvene in light of this new evidence. The body quickly
published a supplemental report recommending the purchase of the French properties in Panama
and the construction of a canal there.58 On June 19, 1902, after a prolonged series of Senate
hearings, Congress authorized the president to proceed with a canal via the Panama route.59
Despite his apparent lack of participation in the Commission’s real work, Johnson gave the
assigned task his full attention. The university provided him with a leave of absence that
ultimately covered the 1899–1900 and 1900–1901 academic years. He removed to Washington,
DC, where the Commission provided him with an office and an assistant. Johnson principally
focused his efforts on making an estimate of the canal’s potential benefits to American industry
and commerce. In addition to consulting materials provided by the United States Bureau of
Statistics, American consuls in foreign ports, and a traffic study produced by the New Panama
Canal Company, the professor gathered data about potential canal usage by correspondence and
in-person visits with commercial organizations and other groups of businessmen in American
port and industrial cities. In the spring and fall of 1900 Johnson, his assistant, and fellow
commissioner Samuel Pasco visited seaports between Portland, Maine; and Galveston, Texas, as
well as manufacturing centers of the Middle West, asking businessmen for information.60
Journalists in many of the cities where the party called reported an aspect of their visit that the
economist left out of his report and memoirs. Although they routinely described Johnson as a
professor at a prominent eastern university and representative of the federal government,
7

reporters also recorded the fact that he presented himself to local businessmen as a canal
advocate openly seeking information that would help him to produce a report showing a
waterway’s great value to their community. On a visit to Chattanooga, Tennessee, a local
publication announced Johnson’s labors as preparatory to a report “in which he will urge the
necessity of building and completing the canal.” It called local manufacturers who shipped goods
to the Pacific to contact a Captain Goulding, who desired several “good strong letters” from local
manufacturers who made the heaviest shipments to that quarter, demonstrating the advantage
they would reap if transcontinental freight rates were cheaper, and noted that Johnson was
securing data in a similar manner from other large cities of the United States.61 In Savannah,
Georgia, an observer again noted that Professor Johnson sought to obtain information that could
be used in support of the argument in favor of a canal. After Johnson’s address there, the city’s
men of affairs appointed a committee of nine charged with gathering and arranging statistics to
show the value of an isthmian waterway.62
Johnson sharpened appeals to specific geographical interests and rivalries in his remarks. In
Atlanta, the Constitution’s account of his visit noted that southerners expected to reap a project’s
greatest benefits since the canal linking the two great oceans would be located nearest to the
nation’s gulf ports.63 On a visit to Pittsburgh, Johnson collected a large set of statistics gathered
by the city’s chamber of commerce, reflecting the annual tonnage that left the city for Far
Eastern ports, and the time that could be saved in its transportation through an isthmian canal.64
In his remarks to local businessmen and dignitaries, he maintained that a canal could improve
their competitive position relative to other manufacturing cities. It would assist them with “the
problem of transporting (their) products to the marts of the entire world at a cost comparable
with cities favored by deep-water harbors.”65
As the Commission’s work wrapped up, it became apparent that Johnson also served as the
body’s resident publicist and promoter. He penned a number of articles for popular publications,
as well as academic journals, summarizing its work and explaining its recommendations.66 He
also continued to travel around the nation, emphasizing a canal’s virtues. The professor’s
remarks drew the conflict within his canal advocacy in sharp relief. In early 1901 Johnson spoke
at the American Academy of Political and Social Science in his home city of Philadelphia.
Before a scholarly audience, he emphasized that a canal “will tend to unify the political and
social interests of this wide country and tend to make the American people, dwelling thousands
of miles apart, one in thought and one in action.”67 In the following year, his remarks in the
Midwest again emphasized how the waterway would benefit individual communities, however.
In Cleveland, Johnson insisted that his statistical evidence “shows that the interoceanic waterway
will accelerate and appreciably strengthen the position of Cleveland as a center of production.”
Two days later in Indianapolis he took a similar tack, maintaining that although the city “was
removed from the seaboard, the isthmian canal would be of incalculable benefit” to its economic
fortunes.”68
Nearly a year before its unusual negotiation with the French New Panama Canal Company, the
Isthmian Canal Commission submitted a preliminary report to President McKinley.69 In his
portion of it, Johnson emphasized that a waterway would provide Americans with significant
8

economic benefits, both commercial and industrial, and “strengthen the unity of the national and
political interests of the United States.”70 Aldace F. Walker, chairman of the Atchison, Topeka
and Santa Fe Railway, sharply criticized Johnson’s work. Fearful of an isthmian waterway’s
impact on transcontinental rates, he argued that the study of a canal’s economic benefits was
“apparently organized…for the purpose of finding something for Prof. Johnson to do which
might be related to his own sphere of work.” Pegging Johnson’s work as “the first authoritative
statement of the claims of canal advocates,” Walker suggested that the expert had collected and
assembled his economic data, especially that pertaining to traffic likely to use a waterway in the
future, with an intention to present a canal in the best possible light. Even the most optimistic
promoter of a new railroad scheme in competitive territory would hardly venture to add together
all possible traffic by existing land and water routes, and submit the total as his expectation of
business, he complained. Walker hoped to show that the canal would become a burden to the
taxpayers and gleefully pointed out a flaw in Johnson’s reasoning. The professor had inflated the
canal’s economic potential by estimating the tonnage that might have used the canal had passage
been free to all, while in fact advocating a $1 per ton toll. “The method which has been adopted,
so far as this matter has gone, has been the reverse of scientific,” Walker concluded. Johnson’s
calculations revealed “a species of self-deception that suggests the attitude of an advocate rather
than that of a judge.”71
Johnson’s contribution to the Commission’s full report, published in 1902, organized data in
order to illustrate a prospective canal’s positive economic effects on the United States’ major
geographical regions, including the South, the Northeast, the Central West, and the Pacific Coast
states. It also included quotations from businessmen, which he intended “to be illustrative rather
than comprehensive,” discussing a potential waterway’sbenefitstotheirfirmsandcommunities.72
Many located in the interior South maintained that a canal would enable them to reach Asian
markets by way of ports located on the Gulf of Mexico, rather than the Atlantic or Pacific, at a
considerable savingsinrailroadfreightcost.73 Johnson’s report did not contain remarks from
representatives of railroads linking these cities to Atlantic and Pacific ports nor merchants in
those ports, who each stood to lose a lucrative traffic, but he allowed that upon the completion of
a canal they would see a general decline in the southern trade.74 Nevertheless, he directly
disputed the idea that a canal’s promotion of economic activity in one region or city necessarily
reflected another’s loss.75 He maintained that a canal would provide southerners hoping to
harvest the region’s abundant natural resources and establish new manufacturing enterprises with
an opportunity to bring about economic activity “not now in existence,” eventually yielding
coastal ports a larger volume of trade overall due to the canal’s general tendency to increase
economic activity.76
Johnson addressed the transcontinental railroads’ fear of competition in similar terms. The
economist believed in what he called “socialization of rates,” by which he meant “fixing the
charges … with reference primarily to the needs of society, and only secondarily to the cost or
value of each particular service.” Johnson did not support a direct socialization of rates by
government fiat. Rather, he knew that an isthmian canal would allow many shippers to reach the
West Coast and beyond at considerably lower cost than that paid to the railroads.77 In his
contribution to the Commission’s report, Johnson admitted that the canal’s competition would
9

affect the transcontinental railroads’ “through business” and local traffic. While it would reduce
their rates for transcontinental freight, the canal’s general tendency to promote American
prosperity would, again, more than offset the roads’ loss by the expansion of local traffic, which
he contended was “always more profitable than the through traffic.” He concluded that the
increase in the population of the country and the growth in home and foreign trade would soon
demonstrate the need for the transportation service provided by both the canal and the railways.78
Aldace Walker had correctly identified Johnson’s loyalties and recognized the economist as a
new kind of political opponent. Although his report contained a wealth of statistical information,
the professor parried the railroader’s contentions by assertion. His portion of the Commission’s
report emphasized how a canal would provide national political and economic integration and
specifically argued against the idea that it would enhance individual cities’ competitive positions
relative to others’, the position he had taken in his remarks to local audiences. Nevertheless, the
authority of expertise proved difficult to defeat. Despite Walker’s attack Johnson still
commanded a professional’s respect in many quarters and seemingly rose above the fray of
political and economic interests. Remarking on the professor’s contribution to the Commission’s
preliminary report, the New York Commercial noted how his “expert opinion” that the canal
would not harm the railroads “ought to go a great deal farther with the protesting railway
interests than the scattered lay opinions of canal enthusiasts.”79 Although he lacked any role in
the Isthmian Canal Commission’s real political task, future developments would show that
Johnson’s report had established the Wharton scholar as the nation’s leading expert on an
isthmian canal’s economic aspects, and this reputation would pay off in the coming years.

PANAMA CANAL TRAFFIC AND TOLLS, 1911–1914
The issue of an isthmian canal’s administration, including the matter of tolls, did not come to a
head until the waterway neared completion. Panama Canal Chief Engineer George W. Goethals
had turned a struggling project into successful excavation and construction activity. He had also
developed a vision of its operation emphasizing one-man control of the new administrative
apparatus.80 In the matter of tolls he favored an approach emphasizing the waterway’s financial
self-sufficiency, but his staff proved unable to develop a prospective tolls schedule based on
those in effect at other canals.81 In 1911 American businessmen wrote Goethals to urge a speedy
resolution of the tolls question. Shipping lines and industrial corporations operating their own
fleets needed information quickly so as to allow them to acquire ships most favorably suited to
the Panama rules.82
Goethals soon heard from Johnson. The professor wrote that “there are urgent reasons why
Congress should legislate as soon as practicable upon the question of tolls.” Johnson argued
persuasively for the Congress making toll-setting an executive function. He believed the
legislative body’s parochial interests could only destroy the canal’s usefulness.83 The information
required by President Taft for toll-setting “will need to be secured … from carriers and shippers
and by a concrete study of actual business methods and conditions.” Goethals knew Johnson as
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the author of the Isthmian Canal Commission report’s discussion of a canal’s likely economic
impact, and quickly invited him to Panama for a lengthy consultation.84
Johnson spent late July and August of 1911 in Panama. He and Goethals agreed that the
waterway should produce revenues sufficient to support its operation and slowly recoup the
government’s investment in its construction, though not so high as to divert any potential traffic
and undermine its economic usefulness. They also concurred in their belief that the president
should enjoy the authority to fix and adjust the charges, which should be equal for American and
foreign-flag ships.85 At the end of Johnson’s visit, Goethals cabled Secretary of War Henry
Stimson, requesting the professor’s appointment to investigate and report on Panama Canal tolls
and vessel measurement rules. Stimson quickly complied, naming him Special Commissioner for
Panama Canal Traffic and Tolls.86
Johnson and Goethals used the professor’s appointment and subsequent report as political
implements to promote their vision of the canal’s administration. Upon becoming Special
Commissioner, Johnson had received instructions not only to prepare a report for the president,
but to make himself available to members of Congress in order to provide any information that
they might find helpful in preparing a canal bill.87 When Senator W. C. Adamson of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce wrote to ask Stimson if he had an expert that he
wished to testify before the committee, the secretary named Johnson.88 In 1912the professor
appeared before House and Senate committees arguing against legislative toll-setting, for “the
establishment and adjustment of tolls is an administrative problem. Congress must trust the
Executive with executive problems.”89 Apparently Johnson’s testimony made some headway in
the fight to gain toll-making powers for the executive, as the New York Journal of Commerce
noted that members of the House Committee on Interstate Commerce “are now seriously
deliberating as to whether it would not be a good policy to delegate this duty to the
Administration. They were greatly impressed with the testimony of Professor E.R. Johnson.”90 In
April Johnson sent Goethals proofs of his report chapters for review. He also mentioned that he
had used his position’s access to Congress to engage in lobbying specific members of that body,
noting that he had “kept in touch with Senator Brandegee,” chairman of the Senate Interoceanic
Canals Committee, “and will give him such assistance as I can.” Johnson later reported that
Brandegee had distributed a pamphlet reprinting Chapter Six of his forthcoming report, “the
chapter on The Relation of the Panama Canal to the Traffic and Rates of American Railroads,” to
members of the Senate.91 On June 17, 1912, Johnson provided Goethals with more information
about his efforts. He had failed to track down three Congressional leaders, he reported, and
concluded that “It will be best for me to stick … closely to work on the report on ‘Traffic and
Tolls’ for the next two weeks. As soon as Congress resumes its legislative work, I will make a
point of having a talk with members of the Senate Committee and of the House ‘Conferees’
regarding several features of the canal bill.” 92
Before Congress ruled as to the matter of who would set the tolls, Johnson had begun preparing a
document that would, he and Goethals hoped, provide President Taft with a schedule of fees due
from ships using the waterway. On August 7, 1912, the professor presented Panama Canal
Traffic and Tolls to Stimson, who promptly forwarded it to the president.93 It set out five basic
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goals for the canal’s toll policy. First, Johnson argued, tolls should facilitate the canal’s use.
Second, the canal should become no burden on the American taxpayers. Third, those who
utilized the canal should pay for its operation. Fourth, the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901 bound
the United States to provide canal navigation without discrimination. Finally, the tolls should be
such as to attract whatever shipping had equal resource to the Panama and Suez Canals. With
these considerations in mind, Johnson recommended a toll of $1.20 per net ton for vessels
carrying passengers or cargo; $.72 for vessels without passengers or cargo; and $1.20 for army
and navy transports, colliers, hospital ships, and supply ships.94
Congress voted to establish toll-making as an executive function in the Panama Canal Act, which
President Taft signed on August 24, 1912.95 Thus empowered, the president enacted the Special
Commissioner’s recommended rates in a November 13 proclamation.96 The Panama Canal Act
also expressly exempted American steamship operators carrying cargo between domestic ports
from the payment of such fees, however. Johnson had testified that the campaign for such a
coastwise toll exemption in part played upon popular bitterness toward railroads. An exemption
would drive down railway rates, the measure’s supporters disingenuously argued, by allowing
steamships to offer lower coastwise charges. As a professional economist, Johnson realized that
such a measure would not produce a socialization of rates. Transportation charges reflected
market conditions, and not providers’ costs. Steamship companies would not react to lower tolls
by reducing their rates. They would keep the savings as additional profit.97
Johnson’s efforts changed Stimson’s position on the matter of a coastwise tolls exemption. In the
fall of 1911 the secretary had delivered an address to a group of Kansas City businessmen in
which he discussed “Problems Related to the Panama Canal.”98 He maintained that the canal’s
administration, like its construction, was “essentially an executive problem,” demanding the
attention of a flexible authority informed by expertise.99 At that time he also asserted the United
States’ right to pay tolls for American-flagged shipping, or simply relieve them of the burden of
tolls altogether. Referring to the ongoing discussion of potential tolls paid by the American
coastwise traffic, he recommended that the federal government do so, especially in light of the
fact that English and German lines received government subsidies. He also argued that a
coastwise tolls exemption would produce sea-borne competition with the transcontinental
railroads, leading to a reduction in their cross-country freight charges.100
Johnson later recalled how he had discussed the matter with the secretary shortly after the latter’s
Kansas City remarks, and convinced him “that all vessels should pay tolls.”101 By the summer of
1912 Stimson had begun informing correspondents calling for a tolls exemption that, while he
continued to assert the United States’ legal right to reimburse or waive tolls for American
shipping, he now did “not believe as a matter of national expediency that it should do so.” To
relieve coastwise ships of tolls “would be simply paying money to a special interest which does
not need any such protection.”102 In the spring of 1912 the secretary attacked the idea of a
coastwise tolls exemption in testimony before both houses of Congress, with Johnson on hand to
provide technical information and clarifications as needed in both instances.103 He also cited
Johnson’s study in a letter to the president urging him to oppose a coastwise exemption.104
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Johnson and Stimson’s efforts did no good, however. President Taft refused to act against the
exemption.
Upon the expiration of his appointment as Special Commissioner, Johnson continued to sing the
praises of the Panama Canal in familiar terms. He argued that the waterway’s most important
effect would be “the influence it exerts in the unification of the United States.” America’s
geographic diversity had led to inevitable friction, such that “the clash of the sections has nearly
caused political disruption.” The railroad, the telegraph, and the telephone made political unity
certain, he continued, but every agency that brought the different parts of the country into closer
interdependence facilitated harmonious political and social development. The Panama Canal
would increase the economic solidarity of the United States and promote the rise of a unified
nation: “the canal will help to make us one people.”105
He also continued to argue against the coastwise tolls exemption. At the American Society of
International Law’s debate on the tolls issue he made an argument citing calculations that clearly
showed how the canal required revenue from coastwise traffic in order to meet its expenses.106 In
other settings he repeated his appeals to local interests, however. Before the Traffic Club of
Pittsburgh, Johnson informed businessmen that the exemption would not yield lower rates, only
higher profits for carriers. At Birmingham the professor supplemented his analysis with an
appeal that again cast the Pittsburgh businessmen whom he had just encouraged as geographical
rivals likely to benefit from the exemption. In an address to the city’s chamber of commerce he
extolled the canal’s benefits for the South. If in the past it had been easier to reach the export
markets from Pittsburgh and other northern iron and coal districts than from Birmingham, he
argued that the canal would enable southern iron and steel producers to ship their products
“under more favorable advantages than can their competitors north of the Ohio and Potomac.”107
On June 11, 1914, Congress repealed the coastwise tolls exemption provision of the Panama
Canal Act. The legislation secured the construction of a new part of the period’s administrative
state. It completed the executive branch’s assumption of Panama Canal toll-making authority and
made Johnson’s tolls schedule, for all ships, the policy in effect at the isthmus. Although Johnson
could not claim any substantive contribution to a political victory earned by a Democratic
president using a wide array of the political levers at his disposal to bring his party in line, the
professor’s determined opposition to the exemption represented a further articulation of the
specific variety of political expertise that he had developed in the Progressive State.108
Johnson’s recommendations bore the imprimatur of scientific expertise, but they had not
emerged from a detailed, scientific study of canal tolls alone. Rather, Goethals and Johnson had
discussed the tolls issue before Johnson began his study, and Goethals had reviewed the
professor’s draft report. Taking advantage of his appointed position and using his professional
skills and reputation as political tools, Johnson had engaged, informed, and lobbied members of
Congress and Secretary Stimson on behalf of his and Goethals’s vision of canal administration.
He had also gone to great lengths to engage the public in local appearances. In them he echoed
the argument he had made on behalf of the waterway’s construction as a member of the Isthmian
Canal Commission, appealing to individual cities’ material interests on behalf of a national,
administrative state.
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CONCLUSION
Although the vast majority of work considering experts’ emergence in the federal government
during this period has focused on individuals securing long-term positions, two scholars have
suggested that many served in temporary capacities. Daniel Rodgers reminded his readers that
this phenomenon shows how thin and uncertain the line between state and society remained,
while Theda Skocpol identified short-term service as an obstacle to rational organization and
institutional autonomy, producing a decentralized and fragmented state.109 Emory Johnson’s
work reveals another consequence of a provisional appointment. Apparently unaffected by civil
service regulations, it represented an opportunity for Republican Party officials seeking to
influence, or at least establish some presence in, the new realm of state expertise. Although
Johnson, like so many of his peers, criticized Americans’ locally oriented, partisan politics, he
received his first two state appointments at least in part by dint of his university’s relationship
with Philadelphia Republicans, and he subsequently demonstrated his enduring ties to locality
and party when he became a director of the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange in 1907 and joined
that Republican redoubt, the Philadelphia Union League Club, in 1912.110
The economist demonstrated his partisan identity most clearly with the political ideas that
informed his work, however. Operating outside the closely organized executive bureaucracies, he
found an opportunity to articulate them, grounding his calls for national integration and
executive authority in an intellectual tradition including Whig and Republican beliefs. Although
most members of the Union League would only have nodded their heads at an after-dinner
speaker’s familiar contention that canals and railroads produced prosperity and political union,
Johnson had grown up in, and then had become a scholar of the nineteenth-century political
initiative that gave rise to it. He went on to adopt it as a central theme of his work as an
economist and his persuasive efforts as an expert.
Johnson’s activities brought his nineteenth-century political imagination together with the
political capital in his expertise, which in turn resided in the same skills and reputation that other
professionals serving the executive branch employed. Like them, he sought to construct a piece
of a new administrative state. But he did so in a very different way. Many of them won long-term
appointments and insulation from Democratic politics by cultivating specialized skills and a
reputation for objectivity while also making alliances with new interest groups. As a temporary
appointee continuing to value and improve his university position (he became dean of the
Wharton School in 1919), Johnson paid little attention to his standing and future prospects within
the state.111 He focused on a situation in which he could only help the McKinley and Taft
administrations to achieve their shared policy objectives by plunging into the politics that
scholars have told us other experts sought to avoid, persuading a Congress organized as a set of
geo-graphically defined entities to grant them. Johnson also believed that he needed to influence
Congress at a grassroots level by appeals to a public audience. The economist first used his skills
and reputation to produce reports and testimony communicating his and his allies’ preferred
policies to Congress and, ultimately, lobby its members. He made the same appeals to the
general public in popular periodicals. In these roles he success-fully clothed his belief in canals
securing the Union, and then administrative toll-making, with the authority of social science. He
also used his expertise to reject opposing interests’ objections to the policies he advocated in
official documents. At the same time, he relied on a contradiction within his nineteenth-century
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political ideology and rhetorical stance. His reports contained appeals to local interests that a
canal and its correct administration would supposedly supersede, as did his remarks to audiences
in individual cities. The professor never became an advocate for Philadelphia’s own commercial
concerns during his service to the state. Nevertheless, when he told legislators and local groups
how the canal, or its proper administration, would promote their material interests over those of
other cities, he used his Whig-Republican political ideas to acknowledge and take advantage of
locally oriented democratic politics’ persistent pull in the twentieth-century United States.
Historians and political scientists examining expert professionals’ state-building activities in this
period have often concluded that their emergence marked and symbolized a watershed in which
an often-undemocratic new politics of administration and interest groups displaced the
nineteenth century’s partisan, locally oriented public life. Although Emory Johnson’s statements
and activities in a number of ways seem to support this contention, a fuller examination of his
work shows that his expertise often produced quite a different effect. Scholars have already
pointed out several significant connections between nineteenth-century American state-building
activities and those of the following century. A number of relatively self-directed nineteenthcentury state actors laid a foundation for Progressive state-builders to fashion increasingly
autonomous bureaucracies. A developmental vision informed associative institutional
arrangements that furnished a model for later federal activity in segments of the state more
affected by Americans’ persistent wariness of central authority. Johnson’s work adds to this list
of links. His ideas and activities pertaining to the Panama Canal illustrate a complex set of ties
between the partisan, popular politics of his youth and what scholars have described as the
administrative politics of the succeeding period. Ultimately, Johnson’s activities reveal the
expert as a multidimensional historical figure, rather than an architect and symbol of bureaucratic
modernity, and the Progressive Era’s administrative state as, in at least one instance, similarly
multifaceted and conflicted in its origins. Although the economist was only one man who served
in a very specific capacity, the fact that major works of scholarship have noted that the federal
government often relied on temporary experts in this period, and that many of his peers also
found their roots in the Republican Party’s intellectual tradition, suggests that further
examination of expertise in the Progressive State will uncover other connections, perhaps
similarly paradoxical, between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ institutional politics.
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